Summary

The development of cross-border energy infrastructure is central to the functioning of the EU internal energy market and to the achievement of the Union's climate neutrality objectives. Under Regulation (EU) 2022/869, Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs) benefit from accelerated and coordinated permitting procedures intended to reduce administrative bottlenecks and facilitate timely implementation. While the TEN-E framework establishes binding time limits and one-stop-shop coordination mechanisms, its harmonisation model remains limited, leaving significant discretion to national administrative systems.

This article examines whether divergent national permitting regimes for PCIs and PMIs may generate structurally uneven market conditions within the internal energy market. It argues that permitting procedures, although formally neutral, may operate as de facto determinants of investment timing, regulatory risk and market entry conditions in capital-intensive network sectors. Drawing on doctrinal analysis and comparative insights into national permitting practices, the article explores how administrative asymmetries intersect with principles of competitive neutrality, equal treatment and market integration.

Rather than advancing a claim of doctrinal infringement, the contribution maps structural risk areas where regulatory fragmentation may indirectly affect competition, and situates permitting design within the broader governance of the EU energy transition.

This paper will be part of the OGEL Special Issue on "State Aid and Competition Rules in the Energy Sector". More information here www.ogel.org/news.asp?key=840